Imperial Sugar, one of the largest processors and marketers of refined sugar in the U.S., suffered an explosion and fire on Feb. 7, 2008, at its Georgia sugar refinery, which is located near Savannah. Production at the refinery, which comprises approximately 60 percent of its capacity, was suspended after the accident until the summer of 2009. It occurred at a time when dust explosions where just beginning to come under the microscope in the United States.
Two years prior in 2006, the US Chemical Safety Board released its Combustible Dust Hazard Study which summarized 281 major combustible dust incidents between 1980 and 2005. In this report, the CSB recommended that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issue a comprehensive combustible dust standard for general powder handling industries.
Just months after the Imperial Sugar explosion, in Port Wentworth refinery, Georgia, OSHA announced that it intended to initiate rule making towards a comprehensive combustible dust standard. Unfortunately, at the time of writing (November, 2018), little progress has been made towards a comprehensive combustible dust standard in the United States, from OSHA.
Imperial Sugar consisted of a large processing facility which refined sugar. The processing facility was connected to three storage silos and the packaging and specialty products area by a large system of bucket elevators, screw conveyors, conveyor belts, and horizontal conveying systems. A massive explosion occurred in the center of the Imperial Port Wentworth site, packaging building, destroying or extensively damaging all three sugar silos and the packaging buildings that surrounded the silos.
The explosion and fire resulted in 14 fatalities and 38 injuries, at the Port Wentworth plant.
In this Justice in America investigative special, “Deadly Sugar” we cover the regulatory landscape in 2008, the events that led up to the combustible sugar dust incident, deficiencies reported by the US Chemical Safety Board and the main findings from their investigation.
The February 7 2008, Imperial Sugar, Port Wentworth Refinery, (Savannah Foods), explosion occurred at a time when dust explosions where just beginning to come under the microscope in the United States.
Two years prior in 2006, the US Chemical Safety Board released its Combustible Dust Hazard Study which summarized 281 major combustible dust incidents between 1980 and 2005. In this report, the CSB recommended that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issue a comprehensive combustible dust standard for general powder handling industries.
Just months after the Imperial Sugar explosion, in Port Wentworth refinery, Georgia, OSHA announced that it intended to initiate rule making towards a comprehensive combustible dust standard. In its investigation into the Imperial Sugar Explosion released in September 2009, the CSB strongly reiterated its recommendation to OSHA.
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, little progress has been made towards a comprehensive combustible dust standard in the United States, from OSHA.
The Imperial Sugar Port Wentworth Refinery in Georgia, (Savannah foods), consisted of a large processing facility which refined sugar. The processing facility was connected to three storage silos and the packaging and specialty products area by a large system of bucket elevators, screw conveyors, conveyor belts, and horizontal conveying systems. A massive explosion occurred in the center of the Imperial Port Wentworth site, packaging building, destroying or extensively damaging all three sugar silos and the packaging buildings that surrounded the silos.
The Chemical Safety Board report highlights several deficiencies that contributed to the explosion incident. Two of these had a very large impact on the severity of the explosion. The first was that the conveying systems, dust collectors, and bagging systems continuously spilled sugar throughout the facility. Up to two months prior to the incident, internal documentation indicated that tons of sugar dust were routinely removed from the facility.
The second major deficiency was clogging in the conveying system below the storage silos which caused dust to spill off of the conveyor in the tunnel. Making this situation even more dangerous, a few months prior to the incident this conveyor was enclosed allowing the dust concentration to increase above the minimum explosible concentration.
The explosion and fire resulted in 14 fatalities and 38 injuries at the Port Wentworth plant.
In this Network TV Special we cover the regulatory landscape in 2008, the events that lead up to the combustible sugar dust incident, deficiencies reported by the US Chemical Safety Board and the main findings from their investigation.
The US Chemical Safety Board investigation reviewed four potential ignition sources and ignition energy, for the Imperial Sugar Explosion.
Open Flame: Ignition by open flame was ruled out as no workers were present inside the tunnel system
Faulty Switches: Switches inside the enclosed conveyor were ruled out as the two remaining after the explosion appeared to be rated as explosion proof
Friction Sparks: Sparks from a jammed conveyor could not be ruled out, but additional testing by the CSB demonstrated that these sparks were unlikely to ignite the sugar dust
Hot Surface Ignition: The CSB report indicates that ignition from an overheated bearing may be the most likely ignition scenario. The conveyor was designed such that the bearings were inside the enclosure and in direct contact with the potential dust which had a Minimum Ignition Temperature ranging from 306-420 degrees Celsius.
Reports from workers and the company CEO who was walking the floor at the time of the incident, state that the initial explosion heaved the three-inch concrete floors and shook the building. South stairwell brick walls were blown into the packing building.
This caused the fugitive dust in the packaging building to be dislodged and dispersed, allowing for subsequent explosions and fires.
Video from an adjacent business shows explosions occurring up to 15 minutes after the primary incident and fires starting up to 100 feet away from the silos.
The US Chemical Safety Board concluded that the secondary explosions and fires played an important role in the overall severity of the incident. In addition to injuring employees, these acted to knock out the power system and majority of the sprinkler systems. Knocked down walls and destroyed stairwells also played an important role in making it difficult for employees to escape the secondary fires.
Eight workers died the night of the explosion and six later succumbed to their injuries. Three dozen were treated for injuries at Memorial Health in Savannah while others were transferred to the burn unit in Augusta.
The company was fined $8.7 million and USCSB cited 129 safety violations and determined that the company had been forewarned on a number of occasions about the possibility of what could happen.
Prominent Savannah attorney Mark Tate, whose firm, Tate Law Group, represents 18 plaintiffs, sits down with the Insider Exclusive’s Justice in America news team in a new Network TV Special, “Deadly Explosions – The Imperial Sugar Story” to share what went on behind the scenes in successfully resolving all the legal claims of his clients, confidentially.
You can contact the Tate Law Group @ https://www.tatelawgroup.com/